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Abstract


We offer a critique of conventional approaches to entrepreneurial barriers and point to the neglect of social and emotional processes in their operation. Drawing from qualitative interviews with 25 entrepreneurs in Russia, we suggest that power rituals between entrepreneurs and state officials may impair entrepreneurial motivation. Our main contribution lies in conceptualizing barriers not simply as objective obstacles but as processes of barring and in exploring how these might emerge. We elaborate a model of the social nature of barriers and the mediating role played by emotions. We discuss the implications of barring for entrepreneurial action more broadly. 



Introduction

In this paper we address the issue of barriers to entrepreneurial action. Entrepreneurship, whether conceptualized as business creation, growth, or innovation, ‘requires action’ (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006: 132). Action depends on the motivation to energize, direct and sustain it (Locke and Baum, 2007; Krueger et al., 2000).  Barriers to entrepreneurial motivation are, therefore, of theoretical and empirical importance to the field. By demonstrating how emotionally fuelled processes influence entrepreneurial motivation we extend current thinking about barriers and expand the more general debates about motivation and cognition (e.g. Fitzsimmons and Douglas, 2010; Locke and Baum, 2007; Baum and Locke, 2004; Krueger et al., 2000). In relation to barriers, the available theoretical constructs and empirical knowledge are relatively restricted. While studies have generated impressive lists of perceived barriers, they have said little about the processes by which these perceptions arrive. Without such knowledge the removal of barriers is likely to be far from optimal. Therefore, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by exploring how social barriers to entrepreneurship emerge. 

We elaborate a theory of barriers that is guided by insights from micro-sociology. In doing so, we aim to overcome one of the existing literature’s main limitations: the failure to recognize that many of the barriers confronting entrepreneurs operate as ongoing socio-emotional processes rather than as static ‘obstacles’. We develop a model of ‘power rituals’ (Collins, 2004; Summers-Effler, 2002) and ‘self-conscious emotions’, in particular, shame (Scheff, 1990; Tracy, Robins and Tangney, 2007) to redress this limitation, illustrating this with qualitative data from a study of entrepreneurs in Russia.  Russia, we suggest, is a useful context in which to develop a model of social barriers to entrepreneurial action. The country’s comparatively low level of entrepreneurial activity (OECD, 2009; Seawright et al., 2008; Estrin et al., 2006; Kihlgren, 2002) has been attributed, in part, to an underdeveloped and hostile institutional environment (Aidis et al., 2008; CEFIR, 2005) within which entrepreneurs routinely have to confront different forms of corruption and racketeering in order to develop their businesses (Infante and Smirnova, 2009; Yakovlev, 2006; Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2003; Frye and Shleifer, 1997). As such, it provides what Bamberger and Pratt (2010) have termed an ‘unconventional research context’. We will argue in our concluding discussion that the extreme processes we outline have relevance beyond entrepreneurs in Russia but, for the purposes of theoretical elaboration (i.e. building and extending theory through inductive research – see Lee et al., 1999) we concur with their view that ‘[t]his extremism, though perhaps not easily replicated, allows a researcher to capture constructs and relationships that may be too weak to notice or capture in traditional settings, thus facilitating the development of rich theory’ (2010: 668). 

Conceptualizations of barriers to entrepreneurship

Barriers as objective obstacles

In the entrepreneurship literature barriers are commonly defined as those factors or conditions that constrain entrepreneurial behavior (Kouriloff, 2000) or the antecedents of such (Krueger and Brazeal, 1994). These have been attributed ‘internally’ to characteristics of the entrepreneur or scale of the firm or ‘externally’ to structural/environmental influences (Smallbone and Wyer, 2006; Rauch et al., 2005; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Kolvereid and Bullvåg, 1996; Dyke et al., 1992). Although Krueger (2003) has noted that while barriers can have both internal and external dimensions (an internal barrier to capital might be ‘I can’t find money’, while viewed externally it might be that that lending has ‘dried up’; p. 4), most studies tend to focus on the latter, perhaps because external barriers are more easily operationalized, identifiable, and are, therefore, expected to be amenable to policy interventions. Such barriers are seen as a deterrent to starting a business (Kouriloff, 2000; Krueger and Brazeal, 1994), being innovative (McAdam et al., 2004; Hadjimanolis, 1999) and/or growing a business (Davidsson et al., 2004; Moy and Luk, 2003; Storey, 1994; Barber et al., 1989) by those that might be otherwise inclined. 

It has been argued that a distinguishing feature of this research is the emphasis on classification, on identifying specific barriers and mapping the extent of their presence (Doern 2011, 2009; Barth, 2004; Storey, 1994). Consequently there is a methodological reliance in previous studies on cross-sectional designs, large-scale surveys and structured questionnaires in which entrepreneurs are presented with lists of predetermined barriers (e.g., lack of access to capital, too much bureaucracy, high competition, low skilled labour) and asked to rate each according to perceived importance (e.g. Belso Martinez, 2009; Robson and Obeng, 2007; Pissarides et al., 2003; Bartlett and Bukvić, 2001). Unsurprisingly, results across different studies tend to be inconsistent (Doern, 2009; Sarasvathy, 2004; Curran and Blackburn, 2001; Freel, 2000). In short, most conventional studies have focused on the barrier qua ‘objective obstacle’ rather than the conditions that give rise to it or the ways in which it is perceived (see Parry, 2010, for an exception).

Broadening this focus is important because studies of entrepreneurial cognition have shown that perceptual/cognitive biases can produce significant variations in opportunity awareness and motivation. Such work suggests that it would be unwise to consider barriers to entrepreneurship independently of the ways in which they are perceived. Luthans et al. (2000) point to social cognition as a key way in which entrepreneurs in transition economies reconcile the tensions between environmental factors and previous entrepreneurial behaviors and, thereby, influence their response to barriers. Similarly, when we look beyond the simple label that is attached to a barrier (e.g., too much bureaucracy, lack of access to capital), it becomes readily apparent that many such barriers are strongly social. They will often involve one individual or group (who controls some necessary resource) determining, by a variety of means, which other individuals or groups will be allowed access to such resources and on what terms. Such decisions are frequently based on implicit or explicit judgements about social worth which, in turn, reflect the distribution of power within social situations (Collins, 2004; Summers-Effler, 2002). Thus, although they have not conventionally been considered within the barrier literature, there are numerous studies that point to the significance of such social barriers for entrepreneurship. These include (but are not restricted to) forms of social exclusion (Haugh, 2005), acts of discrimination (Faegin and Imani, 1994; Fielden and Dawe, 2004; Fischer et al., 1993), corrupt practices relating to entry or growth (Dreher and Gassebner, 2007; Tonoyan, 2003), and conflicts of interpersonal relationships (e.g., between business partners or within families; Kellermanns and Edelston, 2004, 2007). The diverse activities encompassed by these themes have all been shown to have significant implications for entrepreneurship, but neither in the studies themselves nor in the wider literature has concerted attention been given to the conceptualization of how such processes operate to facilitate or impede entrepreneurial action. While some studies conducted in transition economies have analyzed the impact of barriers on entrepreneurial action (Feige, 1997; Lynn, 1998; Hendley et al., 2000; Manolova and Yan, 2002; Peng, 2003; Welter and Smallbone, 2011), very few, if any, have analyzed such barriers as processes or as explicitly involving power relations.

Barriers as socio-emotional processes 

The literature on barriers to entrepreneurship, then, appears to be of limited use in addressing issues of process and power. To provide a more fruitful way to address these issues we turn to the field of micro-sociology​[1]​ and, in particular the works of Collins (1981, 2004), Summers-Effler (2002) and Scheff (1990, 1997, 2000). This perspective has been used to demonstrate the operation of power and resistance within entrepreneurial ventures and to map the ways in which social context shapes individual entrepreneurial action (Goss, 2007). We extend this work to provide a conceptualization of barriers. We begin with the notion of power rituals (Collins, 2004) which are closely aligned to the sorts of political encounters between entrepreneurs and state officials identified as barriers to entrepreneurship in transition economies (see further below). By elaborating this construct we hope to provide a novel way to explore the operation of barriers to entrepreneurial action.  

Collins’s interaction ritual chain theory (1981, 2004) postulates social order​[2]​ as the outcome of an ongoing stream of ritual interactions. Rituals involve four ingredients: the physical co-presence of two or more actors; barriers to outsiders (i.e., an awareness that participants are members of a specific activity); a common focus of attention on the activity in question; and a shared mood. When successful, these translate into the outcomes of collective solidarity, individual emotional energy, group symbols and standards of morality (see Collins, 2004; Goss, 2010 for a summary). Not all rituals are successful for all participants and differing combinations of ingredients may translate into different outcomes for participants (discussed below). 

The underpinning assumption is that significant emotions are generated by such interaction rituals (Fessler 2007), captured in Collins’s (1981) notion of ‘emotional energy’: a long-term emotional tone ranging from an up tone of excitement and happiness to a down tone of depression and sadness (p. 1001). For Collins (2004) emotional energy is a crucial ritual outcome as it provides the basis for individual motivation: it stimulates ‘not just … physical activity … but above all, taking the initiative in social interaction, putting enthusiasm into it, taking the lead in setting the level of emotional entrainment’ (p. 107).  

However, in some ritual situations the distribution of emotional energy is unequal, with some participants experiencing gains at the expense of others’ losses. Usually those who dominate the ritual gain emotional energy and those who are subordinate, lose. These are what Collins refers to as power rituals.  We will suggest that power rituals can act as the basis for potent barriers to entrepreneurial action by sapping emotional energy and encouraging inertia. Schumpeter (1934; Goss, 2005) and Shapero (1984) also identified human inertia as a barrier to entrepreneurial behavior - power rituals may help to explain how this inertia is produced and reproduced.

A power ritual is an encounter where (at least) two parties engage in order to secure control over some resource and where, ultimately, one party is confirmed as an order-giver, the other(s) as an order-taker. Where order-givers are perceived to hold legitimate authority by order-takers, the ritual may generate positive outcomes. But where legitimacy is lacking, power rituals tend to reduce emotional energy and engender inertia, which leads to the maintenance of subordinate positioning (Summers-Effler, 2002). Here the unequal parties are likely to meet under constrained conditions, i.e., where order-givers can demand the participation of the order-takers and where there is no pre-existing basis for trust between them. In such circumstances, ‘the situation of taking orders, of being coerced, is in itself alienating’ (Collins, 2004: 112). Thus, order givers generally maintain or increase their levels of emotional energy at the expense of order takers’ loss. This loss is especially acute, maintains Collins, when the power ritual does not bring about solidarity, i.e., when subordinate parties do not wish voluntarily to repeat the encounter - but know they will be coerced into doing so (2004: 114; Summers-Effler, 2002).

Although the notion of emotional energy is central to Collins’s theory, there is, as yet, no agreed or easily operationalized method for its empirical identification​[3]​. To overcome this limitation we develop the suggestion that ‘measures of pride and shame can be useful measures of high and low emotional energy’ respectively (Collins, 2004: 120). Shame, therefore, is of particular interest to our discussion of power rituals as barriers. 

Shame is a social emotion (Cooley, 1922) implicated in maintaining and threatening social relationships (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991). It is seen to arise where valued relationships are threatened and signals the need for individuals to evaluate the quality of their interactions (Fearon, 2004). Shame is thus experienced in response to ‘threats to the social self’ associated with experiences of embarrassment, inadequacy, vulnerability, isolation, rejection and failure (Scheff, 2000).  Anger and fear are not uniquely social but their emergence in response to social threats (Fearon, 2004) has been argued to often be a consequence of a prior sense of shame (Lewis, 1971). 

Shame has been associated with adaptive ‘submission and appeasement behaviors’ (Gruenewald et al., 2007: 73). In social animals such behaviors have been used to indicate social positioning and dominance (Fessler 2007), making it relevant to the notion of power rituals. It will be recalled that power rituals were claimed to be alienating when order-givers lacked legitimacy in the eyes of coerced order-takers. Here it is useful to draw on the distinction between acknowledged and unacknowledged shame (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1990). Both are induced by a perceived awareness of others’ disapproval but in the former case there is a recognition of the (witting or unwitting) transgression that prompts attempts to make amends – to repair the fractured bond and thereby discharge the emotional pain. Unacknowledged shame, in contrast, is associated with disapproval that is perceived as unfairly attributed. The hurt of shame is experienced but it is difficult or impossible to acknowledge this as a failing of the self (which would provide a basis for reparation). Rather the pain is transformed into anger – either humiliated fury directed at the offending party (sometimes openly but often ‘behind their back’) or helpless anger, directed at the self (e.g., for feeling unable to confront the offending party, Scheff, 1990). Even though an individual may not label such a reaction as shame, its close association with a denial of deference in a social relationship, marks this as the root emotion (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1990). Involuntary or coerced consignment to the position of order-taker within a power ritual is likely to induce unacknowledged shame – especially if there is no way to escape this position (one is painfully aware of the other’s situational dominance and one’s own lack of significance in their eyes; Katz, 1999). Whether this shame is experienced as humiliated fury or helpless anger, it can be equated to a loss of emotional energy: motivation is impaired because attention and effort are absorbed by intra-psychic conflict as the individual ‘replays’ the actions and responsibilities they associate with the painful emotional state, rather than channelled into purposeful action (Summers-Effler, 2002). 

Our contention is that a recognition of the socio-emotional dynamics of power rituals is necessary for an understanding of how social barriers emerge. For the reasons outlined above, under conditions where entrepreneurs are compelled to participate in power rituals as order-takers, we would expect to see a limiting effect on entrepreneurial agency.  In the next section we introduce data from a study of entrepreneurs in Russia to support this conjecture. As we stated in our Introduction, Russia’s recent history of official ambivalence and even hostility towards small scale entrepreneurship, provides an unconventional but highly appropriate research context within which to explore novel constructs (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010; Yin 2003; Goffman, 1961). 

Methodology

The research context

Russia is regarded to be a transition economy​[4]​. In this sense the country has, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, moved away from state controlled, central economic planning, towards private sector ownership, market liberalization, and the creation of market-based institutions (Kolodko, 2000; Smallbone and Welter, 2009). However, because institution building (as it involves the development of financial, legal and regulatory institutions) is ongoing and remains underdeveloped (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2010; Puffer et al., 2009), this provides an interesting setting in which to examine barriers to entrepreneurship. In particular, several studies conducted in Russia on entrepreneurship and small business development have identified specific institutional barriers to entrepreneurial behavior that we contend are uniquely social in nature, involving interactions between entrepreneurs and state officials; they include but are not limited to a lack of transparency in legislation, the high volume of and frequent changes in legislation (Balcerowicz et al., 2001), high taxation (Barkhavtova, 2000; Shama, 2001; Bohatá and Mládek, 1999; Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2004; Bartlett and Rangelova, 1997; Danis and Shipilov, 2002; Dadashev et al., 2003), frequent inspections by different state agencies​[5]​, bureaucracy and bribe taking by officials (Aidis et al., 2008; Yakovlev, 2006; CEFIR, 2005; Zamulin, 2004; Kuznetsov and Kuzentsova, 2003; Frye and Shleifer, 1997).  These institutional barriers, in conjunction with a general disregard for/suspicion of small businesses by the government historically (Chepurenko and Vilensky, 1996) in favour of larger enterprises (Kilgren, 2003; Randall, 2001), might explain in part why entrepreneurial activity in the country is limited (OECD, 2009; Seawright et al., 2008; Estrin et al., Bytchkova, 2006; Kihlgren, 2002, 2003; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Polonsky, 1998) and has neglected to fulfil its potential (Acs and Audretsch, 1993; Johnson and Loveman, 1995). 

Data collection

Whereas previous research has focused on barriers qua ‘objective obstacles’ and the identification of such through large scale surveys mainly, we relied on qualitative interviews to explore and develop the provisional constructs outlined above, moving towards a model of the processes involved in understanding social barriers. The data is drawn from a set of 25 semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg (the largest city in Russia after Moscow) between June and July 2005​[6]​. All interviews were conducted by the first author and lasted 1.5 hours on average; 14 were conducted in both Russian and English; 11 were conducted in English only.  An interpreter was present for all of the interviews where Russian was spoken.  To reduce the likelihood of paraphrasing, the interpreter was instructed to translate in small chunks, pausing after every two to three sentences (Rogers, 1997). Further, during four separate intervals spanning the data collection process, portions of transcribed interviews (accompanied by the actual recording) were reviewed by a third party, an experienced translator, fluent in Russian and English.  This was intended to check the quality of the translations. Translation checks have been utilized by other researchers engaged in cross-cultural interviewing (e.g. Rogers, 1997; Bragason, 1997).

During interviews entrepreneurs were asked to reflect on their growth aspirations, experiences of growth and on barriers to growth. This approach runs the risk of fundamental attribution error: participants offer accounts of past actions or future intentions in terms that protect their self-image as entrepreneurs rather than recounting actual events (usually attributing problems and barriers to the actions of others rather than to their own short-comings; Ross, 1977). Although such biases cannot be ruled out completely, we believe that the detailed nature of the interviews, in particular, the opportunity for participants to recount their experiences in depth, and for the interviewer to probe responses, meant that a wholly artificial story would be difficult to sustain across the wide-ranging interview. Indeed, one striking feature was the extent to which participants did provide accounts that made explicit their own mistakes and perceived failings. In all cases, they spoke in depth about their experiences and aspirations, often in very personal and candid ways. If these were cases of retrospective sense-making, they were far from polished performances, giving us some confidence that these answers were not merely safe responses elicited by the structure of the questioning. The intensity with which participants talked about these events and their unprompted recall of distinct behavioral effects, suggest that this was more than a simple opportunity to complain. 

While this study was not explicitly focused on power or emotion, it became apparent from the interviews that discussions of entrepreneurial development were permeated by concerns about relations with state officials and authorities (evident in the accounts of two-thirds of the participants), often expressed in strong emotional terms, and with frequent references to the detrimental effects of these encounters upon entrepreneurial ambition. As we will try to show below, this data allows us to elaborate a conception of barriers to entrepreneurship framed in terms of power rituals, pointing towards a provisional conceptual model of the processes involved. To this end interview transcripts were examined with three areas of exploration in mind, derived from the literature (themes for each are provided in parentheses): (a) interaction rituals between entrepreneurs and state officials (resource equality/inequality; situational dominance/
subordination); (b) emotional responses to interactions with state officials (evaluations of interactions as positive/negative; evidence of strong/threatened social bonds and associated emotions, especially shame); (c) implications of interactions for entrepreneurial behavior (the influence of interactions on the perceived desirability or feasibility of performing the behavior, i.e. growing the business​[7]​). In relation to (b), shame has been shown to be identifiable from data such as interview transcripts (Scheff, 1990; 1997; Tracy et al., 2007; Katz, 1999). Its presence has been inferred from accounts of scenarios in which participants ‘describe problems with social relationships [whilst] . . . simultaneously . . .  presenting a negative impression of themselves to the interviewer’. This is often accompanied by ‘immediately reformulating their references to the relationship such that it appears less problematic’ (Fearon, 2004: 64). It has also been associated with verbal fillers or pauses (around sensitive topics), laughter (giggling, nervous or tense laughter), and certain gestures (blushing, hiding behaviors, fidgeting) (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1990).  We examined transcripts (which included notes and memos identifying pauses, hesitations and other utterances) for indications of shame ‘episodes’ and the presence of words and phrases commonly associated with the emotion (e.g., wanting to disappear/hide, expressions of inferiority, being taken for granted, overlooked or belittled; Scheff, 1990).         

Both authors independently read the transcripts and highlighted what they thought to be relevant extracts. In general there was a high level of agreement; mismatched cases were discussed (by the authors) and either excluded or allocated on the basis of a consensus decision. Taken together, each of these three areas and their related themes help us to understand how social barriers to entrepreneurial action emerge.

From barriers to barring: Social and emotional barring processes

A. Russian entrepreneurs and power rituals 

In their accounts of interactions with state officials, most of the entrepreneurs gave clear indications that these meetings took place within a context of unequal resources where they had little scope to influence the outcome and had little trust in the motives of the other party. A common concern was the need to participate in inspection visits which, for most, seemed little more than a protection racket. For example, since doubling his employee numbers and moving into a larger office space (owned by the state), one entrepreneur (OM15), complained that his business had undergone 43 inspections (over the last year and a half) from various state departments including health and safety, sanitation, the fire brigade and police. ‘All of them [inspections] have to be paid for’, he explained. ‘And I don’t even know when this will finish actually.’ When asked how much he paid for each inspection, he replied, ‘the services of [the] health and safety [inspectors] cost 800 dollars. And you have to know that neither their services nor the services of the others do anything’.  This requirement to buy unneeded services was noted by other entrepreneurs as well:

There is some law that says you must put some asphalt on the driveway. …they [the state] will press on you as long as you don’t do it. It plays no role. It’s just a law and you have to do it. If you have money they will do everything to get the money away from you (he giggles​[8]​) (OM19). 

From several accounts it became clear that there was relatively little doubt about which party was the order-giver and which was expected to comply. Several participants spoke of their fear in the face of inspections. For instance, when tax inspectors called one entrepreneur in to their offices he recalled, ‘[I had to] change my [under]pants’ (OM23), whilst another hinted at what might happen if he went on to develop the business and the various inspectors were not kept happy: ‘[There are] too many inspectors. I don’t want to do big business in Russia. …  It’s too dangerous’ (OM2). There was also a recognition of the arbitrariness of the officials’ power over them during inspections:  ‘they will find something [during inspections] which is not clean, if they want’ (OM14). Several reported being fined (fines often amounted to little more than bribes) for a supposed lack of compliance with legislation (which appeared to be subject to arbitrary interpretation; the discretionary nature of the actions of officials has been noted by others, e.g. see Manolova and Yan, 2002): 

The tax police they said we made one thing [that was not in keeping with the law] not according to the law, but we showed them we are making it according to the law and according to one law it is good, but according to another it is not very good.  So they are making large penalties for us (OM18). 

In concluding this account the participant emphasized the relative powerlessness of the entrepreneur against the bureaucrat: ‘We said that we will go to [a] judge, but in fact it is very expensive, for example, for us to take [this case] to a lawyer … it was very hard to pay all the penalties’. This sense of powerlessness was found elsewhere:
 
They [inspections] waste our time. They demand our attention. So naturally they interfere. … the whole system is not [designed] to help but to draw money from businessmen (OM15).  

These bureaucrats they need money, they need cash. It’s like oxygen. Otherwise they wouldn’t exist. So you pay this and this and this. So the costs of running the business are extremely high (OM4). 


It seems, from the results presented here, that bureaucrats in Russia were, as Frye and Shleifer (1997) have maintained, able to take advantage of institutional inefficiencies such as unclear legislation to impose their own ‘predatory regulations’ on these small businesses, making them, effectively, ‘above the law’ (p. 355; see also Infante & Smirnova, 2009; Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2003). This behavior had the effect of draining from the entrepreneurs vital resources (emotional and material) that could otherwise be invested in the business, as the following extract shows:

I have to lie to try to get out of it all the time [to get out of inspections carried out by state officials] … I always try to get out of it … So I always have to expend energy by trying to get around these governmental controls [inspections]. And much energy is expended on this. If there was less bureaucracy of course we would give this energy to something else (OM17).

The animosity entrepreneurs expressed towards officials seemed to result from the latter’s perceived corruption, but was also fuelled by a sense of being treated as insignificant and unworthy of serious consideration. The impersonal they occurred frequently in these accounts, seeming to emphasize separation and distance​[9]​:

So, the normal way is not working in this country. They are too busy with their backchannels all the time. They don’t have time to do their proper job. They’re busy taking bribes and solving problems for their friends and colleagues and relatives. They don’t have time to deal with normal citizens. They don’t have time for that (OM4).    


There was a deep dissatisfaction with these interactions with officials. A number of participants stated that they would prefer not to engage with officials at all and wished to be left alone to develop their businesses (‘we don’t need any help [from the state] and the biggest thing is that they don’t interfere with our work. We will find the things we need ourselves’, OM12) but seemed unable to conceive of a way in which this might realistically be possible. These accounts suggest both the entrepreneurs’ sense of relative powerlessness in the face of officialdom and their feelings of being in opposition to its values, values that are perceived as taking no account of the value of their businesses. One participant vented her frustration: ‘You see those three rubles we have on the side? We are investing them into something new. And we are doing this, not the government of our city’ (OM5). Another said: 

We don’t believe in it [the state] … all of the time we are trying to cope, trying to adjust to what is going on. So the thing is that wealth of the people, of citizens, [is] absolutely not the same as the wealth of the state in Russia, so everything that, quite a lot of things that, seem to be illegal in the West, [is] just the only chance [we have] to survive here … So it seems that however much money we give [to the state] it seems to get vaporized somewhere and for me it seems absolutely clear that this must be bureaucracy (OM11).

It seems, therefore, that these accounts give at least plausible grounds for asserting that, in their dealings with state officials, Russian entrepreneurs may find themselves involved in encounters that closely resemble Collins’s notion of a power ritual. Because of their control of resources (permits, inspections, certificates), officials can confront small-scale entrepreneurs as order-givers, casting the latter, unwillingly, in the role of order-taker (this is especially potent in societies such as Russia where there is limited access to formal channels of appeal against such authority and where bribery and corruption are rife; that is, courts are perceived to be costly, ineffective, biased and corrupt institutions – see Hendley, 2000; Radaev, 2004; Tonoyan et al., 2010). We now examine the extent to which participants’ accounts of their encounters with state officials were regarded to be problematic and led to feelings of shame. 

B. Entrepreneurs’ emotional responses to power rituals

Interactions with state officials were evaluated quite negatively by entrepreneurs and accounts yielded evidence of unacknowledged shame (like Collins, we use shame as a proxy for emotional energy) - i.e. the actions of state officials were regarded to be unfair and the hurt and anger experienced were not, in turn, attributed to the failing of the self. This took the form of humiliated fury (again, when anger is directed at the other) and helpless anger (when anger is directed at the self because the other cannot be confronted).  In the former case, one participant complained about his troubles with the state electricity provider in particular and state officials more generally. We provide a lengthy extract in this case to demonstrate the ways in which we identified the presence of shame-related emotions from our data: 

I can tell you we have, at the moment we have an issue with the local administration for electricity in the region … they cut down the amount of kilowatts we need, which is actually below our mean which we cannot take. And then they basically told us they will cut off the electricity altogether and they will kick us out altogether because we do not have any license for this. We are here illegally etc etc. So basically they just want money … we rent from the city, official rent, and we pay officially. The contract is here. The fire brigade is very important. We have an installation for fire security and we have had everything checked by the fire inspectors … it is important that it is approved. The paper is here. ‘What do you want?’ When they attack you, they attack you always on formalities. They know that their rules are so stupidly difficult that nobody will follow them. And they will be trying to have a short cut … they are not interested in having you follow the rules. They are more interested in having you on the hook and getting the payments [bribes]. The bureaucrats are not in favour of you following the rules at all. They are not in favour. Nobody will say ‘thank you’ ... Nobody. They are much more interested in having you on the hook just in case and coming in and catching you. When tax inspection comes in they know upfront that nobody can pay their taxes and their weak points will be here and here and here. So the approach of the bureaucrats is to have you on the hook at all times. That’s how this country works … (OM4).

Here, there are explicit expressions of anger captured both in the words and the tone (noted in italics) that are suggestive of fury. We infer the presence of an underlying sense of (unacknowledged) shame from the repeated references to the officials’ disapproval of their entrepreneurialism and the portrayal of themselves as the victims of money-grabbing bureaucrats who show no respect for their integrity or contribution. The account conveys the sense of indignation and humiliation elicited when individuals feel unjustly picked on by others (Hahn, 2010): the disrespect implied by never being thanked and the admission of their own weakness at being forced on to the officials’ ‘hook’.    

Another participant (OM15) who was preoccupied by frequent inspections, high taxes and high rent (which he paid to the state), gave a clear example of helpless anger by becoming incapable of carrying on the discussion about business growth: 

Q: So if I show you a list, which of these represents your intention to grow?
A: That is a very provocative question.
Q: Why? 
A: Because everyone is suffocating me! 

His characterization of the question as ‘provocative’ suggests suppressed rage, elicited by having to confront his failure to achieve his growth ambitions, and casting himself in the role of victim. The anger is helpless, is turned in on himself, suffocating him. Indeed, it is interesting to note that related metaphors of sinking, drowning and being swallowed up have been frequently noted in studies of shame-related discourse (Scheff, 1990; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Nathanson, 1987).

It was clear throughout the interviews that relations between entrepreneurs and state officials were perceived to be complex and delicate.  Interactions with officials were so antagonizing for one entrepreneur (OM14) that he refused to personally participate in them at all, allocating this responsibility instead to the general director: 

‘He solves me all the problems, with administration, with tax police, with all these sanitary inspections. All this shit. … If you do it [yourself], you start to shout. You just spoil all the relations’.
 
Another (OM5) operating two small bakeries gave a slightly different response when she provided an account of the additional work she had to undertake in order to try to stay on the right side of officials, given the arbitrariness of their power (this involved organizing district competitions and generally going out of her way to win favours): 

I have to make their acquaintance. … And I have to be a good girl. It’s better to be friends, otherwise we will have one [inspection] after another and they won’t let me live quietly. … [they] can always find something [to] criticize.

This participant accepts her deferential position and engages in appeasement behavior – i.e. she shows officials that she is committed to the relationship by initiating different forms of cooperation, thereby attempting to build trust (Goffman, 1967; Keltner et al., 1997).  Earlier in the interview she explained that she did not want to make waves by confronting officials about their poor service and corruption: ‘Whenever you lift your head higher that everyone else, you at once become a debtor of everyone else. Because you are a big one’. Her approach to business, therefore, was cautious and largely reactive: ‘I am just navigating through’.   

A few participants hinted that bonds forged with state officials were insecure due to their temporary nature (i.e. state officials were rotated among different posts). One working in the media sector said he spent a significant amount of time nurturing favourable relations with state officials, as these individuals controlled access to vital information upon which his business was dependent (OM7). This appeared to be an emotionally draining process. He explained, ‘the thing is that people [state officials] change . . .  and we have to start over again. This is the biggest problem’. Another elaborated, ‘people are changing so you pay one guy bribes and he guarantees you that as long as he stays on this chair [in his position], nothing will happen … all of the administrative chairs, the thing is they want to make money, all of them’ (OM14). These accounts suggest that with each new relationship, significant emotional energy is expended simply to allow the business to stand still. 

Following negative descriptions of interactions with state officials, there were some attempts by participants to manage shame, as Fearon (2004) suggests, by emphasizing to the interviewer that things were not as problematic as they seemed (either as a form of impression management and/or to indicate that they still maintained some control): 

It takes a very long time to get or process documents. There are many preventative things from the side of the administration in the service industry if you don’t pay additional bonuses [bribes]. … For instance, the building license, contracts with big state organs.  It’s a nauseating thing and I don’t want to talk about it (OM3). 


But only a short while later this entrepreneur added:

I know how I have to talk to people. I know what bureaucrats, government office workers, need. And we do have sufficient money in order to assure ourselves of their service. This is like a necessary expense. But actually, it doesn’t really diminish our profits and we have a bigger profit than do Western companies. It’s just something you can’t get away from (OM3).

Another made an effort to stress that despite the problems, he would ‘make it’:

It will be a lot of time to make it [to move the business to larger premises]. That’s all (he giggles). But we’ll make it …. We should spend some money on the real estate companies that will deal with this because without their help we will not make it because it’s very complicated to buy real estate here in Russia. And [the] second thing [is that] it is quite hard to make [the] registration and everything in the right way … we’ll make it, but we’ll spend some money on this and some time for this … There are a lot of different authorities in which we should register … some of the time the authorities come and ask, why didn’t you make the registration like this, this, and this, and please pay a penalty. And [we] paid one time. It’s bad (he giggles) (OM25).

This participant giggled once after mentioning the bureaucracy involved in buying and registering a new property for the business, and again after he discussed paying a fine; both cases represent potentially painful, resource-draining events for the entrepreneur. While laughter, as suggested earlier in the paper, may signal trouble, it may also serve to dispel shame and preserve the social bond (Scheff, 1990). Put another way, it helps reduce the likelihood that feelings of anger will persist and serve to break the social bond (which may occur with unacknowledged shame, ibid) - and in this case there was certainly nothing conventionally ‘funny’ about this event.

Finally, a few entrepreneurs expressed a sense of rejection. These individuals were keen to note that, in their view, the hostile actions of officials reflected apathy for, or disdain towards, small businesses. Feelings of rejection, vulnerability, and failure are just a few of those that point to an insecure bond and shame ultimately (Scheff, 2000). 

All of those speeches and everything that is said by the government, it seems to be absolutely hot air. It’s just words … if our state were interested in SMEs our taxes would be absolutely different … For example, there may be new tax bills and we are not informed. After some months we get a paper from the tax inspection and they say you didn’t pay this and this and this tax. So you’re going to be fined. There is no support at all at the regional administration (OM19).

One participant felt his business was considered worthless in the eyes of officials – not in terms of benign neglect but as an active form of hostility:

The authorities don’t want small businesses at all. … With the tax police you understand that they aren’t interested in you at all. They say, for example, there are some problems so you may close the enterprise! (OM18)

His indignation seemed to be turned into helpless anger against himself when, at the end of the interview, he asked the researcher whether other participants had negative encounters with the authorities; after being told ‘yes’, he replied:

Sometimes I think, maybe I am tired and I need some rest and everything will be alright. But I suppose it is the situation [and] not only me (OM18).
 
Here too there is a familiar shame indicator: the desire to disappear, to somehow be removed from the situation, confirming the sense of being trapped in a powerless position (Katz, 1999).

It is clear that the entrepreneurs participating in these power rituals did, indeed, show evidence of shame. We can now turn to the way in which these experiences seemed to impact on their motivation for business growth and development. 

C. The effect of power rituals on entrepreneurs’ motivation

For some entrepreneurs, interactions with state officials seemed to reduce emotional energy and the motivation to grow. In the latter case, interactions made the prospect of growing seem less attractive and/or feasible (i.e. these participants did not feel they were able to grow). If we recall OM15’s response, once he recovered his composure (following his account of feeling suffocated, above), he entered in to a more defensive mode. Survival, it seemed was his main concern rather than growth:

I put it as my first level aim not so much to develop the firm but to survive and buy these premises. This is the most important issue for me for the next five years. I want you to understand this clearly, I am not putting in the first position now some development of the company ... 

The fact that he emphasizes ‘I want you to understand this clearly’, suggests that this is in conflict with his own desire, it represents a scaling down of any ambitious impression he may have given earlier; he is now confronting his limited agency. At this point in the interview he also began to pick up, but now more openly, on a theme that had emerged prior: the constraining role of other external forces. He then explained how his ability to grow the business was affected by competition from Moscow-based businesses.  He claimed that these businesses had ample financial resources and with these resources such businesses ‘expand[ed] like a spider’s web in the whole country’.  Many of these also had connections with members of the St. Petersburg administration and for this reason he believed they were able to secure many commercial contracts. He saw this very much as being barred from participating in rituals that were necessary to secure growth – even as a lowly order-taker:

Moscow is following the same policy of reconstructing Russia as [that which] existed under the Tzar. So everything should come from the top. So, of course, when managers from Moscow come to some organizations here [in St. Petersburg] naturally they will complete many negotiations and contracts with friends from Moscow. Sometimes it’s ridiculous. 

It is significant that this participant discursively frames his explanation for his business difficulties in terms of the social relations within which he constructs his sense of powerlessness. The account is tinged with a sense of unjust exclusion, rejection and humiliation and gives the impression that entrepreneurial expansion is not the exciting promise of achievement and drive, rather it is a shattered dream characterized by weariness and resignation. This is reminiscent of OM18’s comment (above) about being tired. He questions the desirability of staying in business if interactions with officials are likely to persist:

We have a lot of inspectors who can check something. For example when I started the business there was one inspection in two years. There was no one [who] cared about it … [I was] not so nervous. And now you feel it is something not so good. And there is this wish to get out from the shops to have the business which is not so, how to say … in the sights of the inspectors … for instance when we worked in [CD] distribution, they couldn’t see us. So it is quieter to work. Morally quiet. You are only [doing your] job. You don’t spend time … talking to inspectors and solving problems with them.


Missing from many of these accounts is a sense of optimism and excitement about future possibilities; in contrast there is a world-weary resignation (evident in the words of the previous entrepreneur who described a lack of state support and bureaucracy in Russia as being, ‘like rain and snow’ – OM18). This resignation was evoked when participants elaborated on their experiences of dealing with officialdom, i.e., their position in power rituals, suggesting that this is part of an ongoing socio-emotional process rather than a reflection of (pessimistic) individual personalities.  

In fact, when their talk moved away from these interactions with officials, there was often a sense of optimism among participants.  Some expressed hope for the future: 

I have many interesting ideas for developing our business, and I think, I trust, I believe, we can achieve this (OM7). 

I’ve been dealing with [this] business for 12 years now and in these 12 years I’ve had the possibility to show everybody that I had the ability to lead a company. … We are at a positive point in our development at the moment. …we have motivation (OM21).  

We have very good potential for growing (OM12). 

This does suggest motivation was not totally absent, even in the face of active barring. The study’s focus on barriers may have gone some way to encouraging participants to emphasize the negative, but we would maintain that the emotional loading of these discussions (the accounts of dealings with officialdom were far more passionate than the optimistic statements) suggest that these are deeply felt experiences and not merely an artefact of questioning. For these entrepreneurs, at least, barring did seem to be an active force, not just a challenging foil for their motivation.

Discussion

In making the case that official power actively bars entrepreneurial endeavours it could be suggested that we have gone too far towards emphasizing constraining forces and, thereby, undermined the potential power of entrepreneurial motivation. But our conception of constraining forces as active processes of barring makes explicit the potential for balances of power to shift and to engender resistance. In particular, it requires us to explain why, and under what conditions, resistance to barring would be successful. Although we have not developed this aspect through the present data, Summers-Effler (2002) has shown that, faced with subordinate positioning in power rituals individuals tend to react in one of three ways:  i) resist the positioning (Open Resistance); ii) avoid or minimize such interactions in the future (Withdrawal); iii) continue to participate in these interactions and manage their emotional response to their positioning internally (Reluctant Acquiescence). These possibilities are represented in Figure 1. As we discuss further below, the basis for adopting one response rather than another seems likely to lie in a combination of immediate social context, an individual’s access to wider networks of relationships beyond the immediate power ritual, and biographical experiences.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

It should be noted that the data we have presented from our Russian entrepreneurs mostly provides empirical support for Summers-Effler’s response pattern (iii), Reluctant Acquiescence, largely because the continuation of their businesses necessitated ongoing involvement in the official power rituals, effectively ruling out the second path (Withdrawal). Two participants (OM18 and OM14) did express a desire to avoid contact with officials (pattern ii) but admitted this would be difficult in practice, as would Open Resistance. However, as Summers-Effler (2002) has shown, even an apparently passive response such as Reluctant Acquiescence can limit motivation. Emotional and cognitive energy are channelled into resolving the intra-psychic imbalance created by the shame of having to submit to the other’s perceived unjust domination, rather than directed towards preferred goals (such as business growth). This motivationally draining effect is apparent in the ways in which our entrepreneurs managed the practical implications of Reluctant Acquiescence. These included paying off state officials, investing in relationships with them, and delegating direct interactions with officials to other members of the organization. Our participants’ accounts suggest that each of these strategies evoked negative emotions; even for many of those with adequate resources (like OM3), the need to pay ‘bribes’ was a source of anger and resentment (reflecting the shame at being unable to resist this imposition). Where ties were established with officials, these were described as an ongoing source of anxiety: participants (e.g., OM5 above), reported that maintaining such relationships demanded their time and energy, together with the constant fear that a change of officials would jeopardize their ‘investment’. Similarly, delegating direct interactions with officials appeared to mitigate an entrepreneur’s risk of intense short-term emotions (rage, aggression) that might threaten the relationship, but did not seem to remove the underpinning shame of being unable to handle a crucial aspect of the business whilst still having to accept an unwanted outcome (any shame at having to delegate may be offset by a superior outcome). 

These responses resonate with Oliver’s (1991) strategy of ‘compromise’, of partial compliance to institutional pressures​[10]​; partial in the sense that the organization does not conform entirely to institutional pressures but mounts a minimal degree of resistance so that it can continue to pursue some of its own interests. Oliver identifies such a response where institutional demands are ‘conflicting’ or inconsistencies exist between ‘institutional expectations and internal organizational objectives related to efficiency or autonomy’ (p. 153). In Russia demands are conflicting to the extent that on the one hand, formal regulations (e.g. tax legislation) require compliance from organizations but, on the other, state officials promote the evasion of these regulations through individual negotiations. Oliver (1991) notes that organizations may adopt a strategy of ‘avoidance’ to disguise their non-conformity to institutional pressures by exiting the situation. We would maintain that our research extends this institutional perspective by adding an awareness that micro-level processes are an integral part in explaining how such organizational responses to an environment develop. In this we share Clark’s (2004) view that Oliver’s categorizations do not fully develop the ways in which human agency shapes ‘internal political process and a complex of values and meanings’ (p. 611). Oliver says: ‘the choice between acquiescence and more resistant strategies will depend on the degree to which the organization agrees with and values the intentions or objectives that institutional constituents are attempting to achieve in pressuring the organization to be more socially or economically accountable’ (p. 162).  We maintain that an analysis of micro-processes such as power rituals provides a valuable insight into the ways in which agreement and legitimacy are established as concrete practices and the power dynamics implicit in ‘pressuring’ are exercised. Research in other transition economies has found that where institutional uncertainty is high and the arbitrariness of power held by state officials is apparent, firms devise strategies that are largely adaptive and focused on survival (e.g. Welter and Smallbone 2011; Manolova and Yan, 2002). The focus for entrepreneurs becomes what is possible rather than what is desirable (Hrebniak and Joyce, 1985) and, in such cases of arbitrary power in the hands of particular individuals, an explanation in terms of social situations as well as institutional context seems highly desirable. 

This is evident if we explore the factors that may have shaped entrepreneurs responses to power rituals and, in particular, the tendency towards Reluctant Acquiescence. Here, we focus on an entrepreneur’s network resources and biographical experiences. One possibility is that an entrepreneur’s potential for resistance may lie in their acquisition of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Networks of relationships can provide access to tangible and intangible resources (e.g., material resources or connections to powerful people) but, when successfully executed, they also operate as interaction rituals and produce the gains of emotional energy and solidarity between participants. This may strengthen any base for resistance or challenge to non-members. These emotionally energised relationships can allow an entrepreneur to follow an innovative path, to do something different in the face of others’ attempts to maintain the status quo. However, for entrepreneurs in the sorts of situation captured by our study, developing social capital in this way appears limited for three reasons. First, entrepreneurs in Russia, particularly those operating small businesses, are much less likely than large businesses to have strong connections with officials and other powerful acquaintances with links to old Soviet structures (Puffer et al., 2009; Avtonomov, 2006; Puffer and McCarthy, 2001). Second, building networks with lower level (but more accessible) state officials may be of limited significance if turnover among the latter is high, as some of our participants suggested (viewed more broadly, the rotation of public officials may be seen as a precautionary measure intended to reduce corruption in the long term – see Tonoyan et al., 2010).  Third, there is a high level of generalized distrust in Russian society (a legacy of the Soviet era) towards the government (following years of propaganda and persecution at the hands of the Soviet regime) and organized groups (such as professional associations, etc.) that might be perceived as vehicles for covert interests (e.g., the so-called ‘mafia’). In consequence, those with limited connections may prefer to rely on informal personal relationships (see Radaev, 2005; Puffer and McCarthy, 2001), sacrificing potential collective impact for safety.  Under these conditions opportunities to resist the draining effect of power rituals through alternative forms of association are restricted. Under less restrictive social conditions we might expect to find evidence of the Open Resistance and Withdrawal patterns depicted in Figure 1. However, for the present study, these remain as hypothetical possibilities awaiting empirical verification. The power to resist subordinate positioning might also depend partly on the characteristics and personality differences of individual entrepreneurs – their biographical experiences. In keeping with Collins (2004), we suggest that these experiences may also be constructed through social interaction and are, therefore, both emergent and dynamic, like the social barriers perceived. 

Conclusions

This article began with a critique of conventional approaches to researching barriers to entrepreneurship, highlighting the need to understand how barriers emerge. Our main contribution lies in conceiving of barriers to entrepreneurial action as dynamic socio-emotional processes rather than as objective or subjective obstacles. As such we follow Rindova et al.’s (2009) advice to frame our constructs in terms of verbs rather than nouns. Thus, rather than talking only of barriers, we believe that it may also be useful to speak of barring practices. Certainly in the case of transition economies, the socio-emotional processes we have outlined between entrepreneurs and state officials would seem to be well captured by this notion. By defining encounters between entrepreneurs and officials as power rituals (Collins, 2004) in which entrepreneurs are obliged to assume the role of order-takers, we clearly expose the power of officials to actively bar entrepreneurial endeavours. Indeed, we have also shown that barring is not merely a form of impersonal obstruction. Rather, involvement in the process of barring seems to have consequences for the entrepreneurs’ motivation, reducing their emotional energy to pursue growth through shame-related dynamics (Scheff, 1990). Our findings extend research on the antecedents of entrepreneurial motivations by adding the active role of social situations and their associated emotions to established constructs (e.g., perceived behavioral control, feedback from prior performance, Davidsson, 1989; Kolvereid, 1992; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Delmar and Wiklund, 2008). In so doing they develop previously limited theoretical constructs and empirical knowledge relating to barriers to entrepreneurship, and partly explain why some firms are unable to grow, or stop growing and decline (Storey, 2011).

One limitation of this research is that interviews were not explicitly focused on the interactions between entrepreneurs and state officials and the power dynamics that ensued – this was an emergent finding from the data. For this reason, further research is needed in order to verify and potentially expand on the processes described. A second limitation is that because the study utilized a cross-sectional design, we were not in a position to examine how encounters between entrepreneurs and state officials unfolded over time or whether entrepreneurs’ perceptions had changed and why. Future research would benefit from adopting a longitudinal design and process-based methods such as diary studies. There is also a need to examine under what conditions alternatives to power rituals (e.g., between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders) could be constructed and maintained.  If our theory is correct, such relationships could have an important role to play in wealth creation more broadly, providing the micro-level building blocks for productive institutional arrangements (Olson, 1996). Moreover, if the availability of alternative mutual support mechanisms is one way that emotional energy can be generated, it would be interesting to examine the ways in which entrepreneurs interact together (e.g., through trade/professional associations, bodies such as local chambers of commerce or informal networks) and to identify if central membership in such networks encouraged greater propensity towards entrepreneurial motivation than amongst isolated entrepreneurs. Such an analysis would require a focus on comparisons between different social situations and contexts. Finally, future research should consider the possible gender differences in relation to the socio-emotional barrier processes outlined in this study. Because women frequently have fewer opportunities for power and may be less able to resist subordinate positioning as a result, they may be more inclined than men to manage their negative emotions through forms of acquiescence or appeasement (Summers-Effler, 2002). It has, for example, been well established that access to start-up credit remains significantly more favourable to men (Marlow and Patton 2005). Treating such processes as ‘credit rituals’ might throw light on the ways in which the behavior of order-givers appears to systematically bar women from access to funding whilst, simultaneously, provoking relatively little explicit resistance or challenge. Such research could have important implications for our understanding of why entrepreneurial activity amongst men and women differs and for pointing towards specific ways of addressing this.   

Our study has focused on a context where bureaucracy appears to be valued over free enterprise, institutions to support enterprise are weak or underdeveloped, individual initiative is discouraged and unproductive entrepreneurship (e.g. rent-seeking behavior) is favoured over productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1991; Balazs, 1964). Such conditions are conducive to the development of power rituals which, we have suggested, provide a mechanism that inhibits innovation and creative entrepreneurship (in the latter case, this may lead to what Wittfogel, 1957, refers to as a ‘developmental trap’). Our entrepreneurs seemed to spend a significant amount of time and effort interacting with bureaucrats in ways that drained emotional and material resources which could otherwise be invested in business development. However, despite the somewhat extreme nature of this context, there is no reason why more subtle forms of power ritual will not confront entrepreneurs in developed market economies. Securing credit from banks and other financial institutions, local and national regulatory practices, corporate dominance of supply chains, all have the prospect of casting small entrepreneurs in a ritualized order-taking position. And all could prove corrosive of entrepreneurial motivation. Dealing with these complex social barriers, along with the mediating role played by emotions, requires a more dynamic understanding of their nature and operation. One step in this direction is to move beyond a conception of barriers as static obstacles and towards an understanding of the dynamics of barring.

Figure 1. Provisional model of social and emotional barring processes 
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Power Rituals

Barriers 
constructed 
through 
social processes

Emotional 
Effects

Shame 
and loss of 
emotional energy

Withdrawal

Reluctant
Acquiescence

Open 
Resistance


Network Resources 
and
Biographical
Experiences
Alternative sources 
of emotional
energy 

A

B

C

Path A is enabled when significant emotional energy and oppositional solidarity are gained from network resources and biographical experiences and power ritual participation may be challenged.
Path B represents a conservation of emotional energy in the absence of an alternative to power ritual participation.
Path C is enabled when network resources and biographical experiences offer the support and energy to escape, rather than challenge, power ritual participation. 









^1	  According to Collins (1981), micro-sociology is ‘the detailed analysis of what people do, say, and think in the actual flow of momentary experience’ (p. 984).  
^2	  Frank (1944) defines social order as ‘[T]he way different personalities have accepted and translated the teachings of their culture and have learned to use the group-sanctioned practices of institutional life as their personal design for living. Social order arises … from the patterning of human behavior into the conduct approved by the group traditions’ (p. 474).
^3	  We do not share the criticism that this is a purely hypothetical construct (it has a provenance in the literature relating to, for example, mood; e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Forgas and George, 2001; Watson and Tellegen, 1985; Lawler, 2001; Weiner, 1986).
^4	  Transition economies are defined here as former centrally planned economies once part of Socialist system for an ‘extended period of time’ – e.g. the Former Soviet Union (which includes Russia), Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (Peng, 2000: 14).   
^5	  It is worth noting that while since the introduction of the ‘Law on Inspections (2001)’ state agencies are prohibited from carrying out more than one inspection of a firm within a two-year period, it has been reported that some agencies have ignored the law and/or have doubled the fines (Zamulin, 2004).
^6	  Entrepreneurs were selected to participate in the study on the basis they had recently grown the business or had plans to. Five women and 20 men participated. The gender distribution, while not optimal, is fairly typical of the proportion of female-to-male owned businesses in Russia. Entrepreneurs were between the ages of 25 and 65. They were all running businesses which employed no fewer than 10 and no more than 100 people (the legal definition for small businesses in Russia); further, these businesses had been operating for more than two years and in a range of industries (e.g. construction, education, retail, textiles, food and beverages, IT or media services, small-scale production).
^7	  Previous research suggests that certain characteristics of the environment indirectly affect entrepreneurial intentions and behaviors by influencing antecedents of intentions – i.e. perceptions of desirability and feasibility (Krueger et al., 2000). Here perceived desirability captures the desire to grow whereas perceived feasibility is about feeling able to grow the business in terms of having access to the right opportunities and resources. The relationship between intentions and motivations is such that ‘intentions capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior’ (Ajzen, 1991: 181). 
^8	  The role of laughter will be discussed in the next section on emotional responses to barriers. 
^9	  Previous research suggests that people are prone to removing themselves from shame-producing situations (we argue in the next section that power rituals between entrepreneurs and state officials create a sense of shame) and that such situations motivate individuals to initiate certain behaviors such as ‘separation, distance and defense’ (Tangney and Stuewig, 2004: 330).  
^10	  Oliver developed a typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures “that vary in active organizational resistance from passive conformity to proactive manipulation” (p. 145).
